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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

THE PROBATE OF WILLS IN PENNSYLVANIA
(continued from March, 1950).
By
A. J.WHITE HUTTON*
40

Cross's Estate

The principles and rules enunciated in this case over twenty-five years ago
are applicable today with a few modificiations and statutory changes. The case
has frequently been cited with approval in later opinions written by the Justices
42
of our Supreme Court,' 1 one of the most recent being Quein's Estate. Under
3
the enlarged provisions of the Act of July 1, 1937, as amended,' the issues may
now be tried in either the common pleas or the orphans' courts, at the discretion
of the latter. Again, it was particularly specified that when the issues were tried
in the orphans' court only one appeal shall be taken and that to be from the final
decree of that court, in which appeal all alleged errors may be assigned whether
4
the essential facts
arising in the jury trial or otherwise. In Klingner v. Dugacki"
and the procedure are thus stated by Stearne, J.:
"Joseph Dugacki, the decedent, died June 25, 1940, unmarried and
without issue, leaving to survive him as next of kin, brothers, sisters
and issue of a deceased brother. A paper purporting to be the will of decedent was probated. It was dated June 24, 1940, and by its terms bequeathed the entire estate to Frank Klingner, a stranger to his blood. An
appeal by a brother from the probate was perfected. A petition by two
of the brothers for a citation directed to the proponent of the will and
all next of kin was granted by the orphans' court, to show cause why
the appeal should not be sustained and an issue d.v.n. be awarded to
to the common pleas to determine the following questions: '(1) Whether
or not at the time of execution of said writing, the decedent was a person of sound mind; (2) Whether or not the said writing was procured
by undue influence, duress and constraint practiced upon the said decedent Joseph Dugacki by Frank Klingner and others; (3) Whether or
not the said Frank Klingner practiced or used any fraud on the decedent
or the legal heirs of the decedent at the time he procured the said writing; (4) Whether or not the said writing isthe will of said decedent.'
* A. B., Gettysburg; A. M., Gettysburg; LL.B., Harvard; LL.D., Gettysburg; Professor of
Law, Dickinson School of Law; former Member Pennsylvania House of Representatives; Author
of HUTTON ON WILLS IN PENNSYLVANIA;

Member of Pennsylvania and Franklin County Bar

Associations; Member of Advisory Committee, Law of Decedents' Estates and Trusts, Joint State
Government Commission of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
40 278 Pa. 170, 122 A. 267 (1923).
41 Lares Estate, 352 Pa. 323, 42 A.2d 801 (1945); Klingner v. Dugacki, 356 Pa. 143, 51

A.2d. 627 (1947).
42 361 Pa. 133, 62 A.2d. 909 (1949).
4s P. L. 2665, 20 P. S. 2585 as amended '.ay 5, 1939 P. L. 94.
44 356 Pa. 143, 51 A.2d. 627 (1947).
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An answer was filed by proponent, a hearing had, and by an opinion
and decree, an issue was awarded to the court of common pleas to determine: (1) whether or not, at the time of the execution of the writing
alleged to be a will dated June 24, 1940, Joseph Dugacki possessed testamentary capacity, and (2) whether or not the said writing was procured by undue influence, duress, constraint or fraud practiced upon the
and others. No appeal
said decedent by proponent, Frank Klingner,
4s
was taken from the award of the issue.
"Upon the trial of the issue in the court of common pleas the jury
found (1) at the time of the writing alleged to be a will dated June 24,
1940, decedent did not possess testamentary capacity and (2) that the
writing was procured by undue influence, duress, constraint or fraud
practiced upon decedent by proponent and others. Motions for new
trial and for judgment for proponent n.o.v. were dismissed in an exhaustive opinion by the court en banc. A decree was entered sustaining
the verdict, which was certified to the orphans' court. On the same day
the orphans' court entered its decree sustaining the appeal from the register. The two appeals to this Court followed.'
In Leadenham's Estate46 a judgment having been entered on the verdict, the
record was returned to the orphans' court where a final decree was entered, inter
alia, refusing the petition for a supplemental inventory. From which decree and
from the entry of final judgment in the common pleas, petitioners, as stated by
Walling, J., "brought these appeals, properly brought (Cross's Est., 278 Pa. 170;
Catler's Est., 225, Pa. 167) and they will be considered together."
The judgment of the common pleas was affirmed and likewise the final
decree entered in the orphans' court.
In Brehony v.Brehony,47 howevet, it was declared by Kephart, J.:
"Under the rule in Cross's Est., 278 Pa. 170, where an issue had
been awarded to the common pleas to determine a substantial dispute
as to the validity of a will and has been decided, the losing party, if he
desires to avoid the consequences of the judgment, must appeal directly from that court; hence, the appeal in this case is proper, and it is
not necessary to take an appeal from the orphans' court."' 8
Griffith's Estate'9
This was an appeal from a decree of an orphans' court in an issue devisavit
vel non, sustaining the validity of a second codicil to the will of a decedent.
The register had certified the proceeding to the orphans' court under Section 19 of the Register of Wills Act of 191750 as "a difficult and disputable ques45 The last sentence is an inadvertence and unnecessary to case. Letter from Justice Stearne
dated March 14, 1950 confirms this statement. See Schwilkes App., 100 Pa. 628 (1882).
46 289 Pa. 216, 137 A. 247 (1927).
47 289 Pa. 267, 137 A. 260 (1927).
48 Cf. Klingner v. Dugacki, supra, note 44, where the two appeals were taken.
49 358 Pa. 474, 57 A.2d. 893 (1948).
50 P. L. 415, 20 P. S. 1982. See note 20, ante, of this article in March Number, 1950, of
thisReview.
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tion" and the court later determined that a substantial issue of fact existed and
decreed that the issue be tried by a jury in the orphans' court under the Act of
July 1, 1937, as amended by the Act of May 5, 1939. 51 Later it was agreed by
counsel that the case should be tried by a judge without a jury in the orphans'
court as authorized by the Act of April 22, 1874.52
In affirming the decree and judgment of the trial court, Stearne, J. lucidly
explained the functions of a trial judge presiding at a jury trial in a will contest and likewise those of a chancellor and hearing judge constituted both judge
and jury by agreement of the parties. The learned justice thus observed:
"We have repeatedly defined the function of a trial judge when
presiding at a jury trial in a will contest. In Lare's Will, 352 Pa. 323,
334, 42 A. 2d. 801, 806, it was said: '. . .The trial judge, who sits to
determine an issue devisavit vel non, acts as a chancellor. He is not
bound by a verdict when it is against the manifest weight of the evidence,
which is addressed to him quite as much as to the jury. If his professional
and official conscience is not satisfied that it is sufficient to sustain a
verdict against the will, either because it lacks probative force or inadequacy, it becomes his duty to set the verdict aside: Kustus v. Hager,
269 Pa. 103, 112 A. 45; Keller v. Lawson, 261 Pa. 489, 104 A. 678;
Englert v. Englert, 198 Pa. 326, 47 A. 940, 82 Am. St. Rep. 808.' Brehony, Ex'r, v. Brehony, 289 Pa. 267, 270, 137 A. 260. See also: Guarantee T. & S. D. Co. v. Heidenreich, supra (290 Pa. 249, 138 A. 764);
Bulhan v. Keslar, 328 Pa. 312, 194 A. 917.
Conversely, a verdict sustaining the will must stand where the hearing judge's professional and judicial conscience is satisfied that there
is not sufficient evidence to support a verdict against it. In the instant
case the hearing judge, as chancellor, was constituted both judge and
jury by agreement ot the parties. His findings of fact, therefore, have
the same force and effect as a verdict of a jury, approved by the trial
judge. While. there was contradictory evidence as to whether the disputed codicil was executed by decedent or was a forgery, and whether
at the time of the execution decedent possessed testamentary capacity,
the findings of fact that decedent did execute the writing an possessed
testamentary capacity are supported by sufficient competent evidence
and are affirmed by the court en banc. They must, therefore, be accepted
as correct and are binding on appeal. In re Cross's Estate, 278 Pa. 170,
184, 122 A. 267; In re Lare's Will, supra. There was no proof submitted
concerning the exertion of undue influence. That allegation must therefore be disregarded."
This case is an illustration of the one appeal situation where the entire course
of procedure is confined to the orphans' court, whereas both Leadenham's Estate,
supra, and Brehony v. Brehony, supra, are instances where the issues were sent
51 P, L. 94, 20 P. S. 2585. In the statement of the procedure in opinion of the Supreme
Court appears a similar inadvertence as noted, supra, note 45.

52 P. L. 109, 12 P. S. 688; Act of June 25, 1937, P. L. 2090, 12 P. S. 695 as to Phila. Co.
Under Act of 1874, the stipulation must be in writing. Goldfrab v. Coal Co., 54 D & C 321
(1946); Bender v. W. M. W., 43 Sch. L. R. 74 (1947).
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over to the common pleas by the orphans' courts. Likewise the more recent case
of Klingner v. Dugacki, supra, illustrates the two appeals situation.
In Quein's Estate, supra, in reversing the lower court decree, Stearne, J. thus
admonishes and explains:
"To avoid unnecessary delay and expense, we will not remit the
record to the court below to determine preliminarily whether there exists
a substantial dispute of fact. Cf. DeLaurentiis' Estate, 323 Pa. 70, 186
A. 359; Lare's Will, 352 Pa. 323, 42 A.2d. 801, and the many cases
which follow them. A substantial dispute is disclosed both in the testimony and in the opinion of the court. The record is remitted with direction to the court below to award an appropriate issue devisavit vel
non to determine whether the questioned codicil s were procured through
undue influence, fraud or duress. This issue may be tried by a jury in
the common pleas, by a jury in the orphans' court, or by a judge in the
orphans' court without a jury if the parties so agree, in accordance with
the statutes hereinbefore cited. Cf. Griffith's Will, supra. The proper
procedure to be followed at the hearing has been frequently stated by
this Court. Keen's Estate, 299 Pa. 430, 149 A. 737; Plotts' Estate, 335
Pa. 81, 5 A. 2d. 901; Szmahl's Estate, 335 Pa. 89, 6 A. 2d. 267."
Jury Trial Waived
As already pointed out in Griffith's Estate, supra, by agreement in writing
a jury trial may be waived. Nevertheless, it would appear that despite the provisions of the Act of 18746 3 the court may, if it is deemed advisable, send the
issues to the jury under Rule 1 in Cross's Estate64 and that might happen under
either of the hypotheses set forth in Rule 4 of that case. In the case of In Re De5
there was a stipulation entered by counsel for the parties in inMaio's Estate"
terest, all of said parties being sui juris, agreeing that "in the event that the
Hearing Judge determines that an Issue Devisavit Vel Non shall be awarded th
said issue may be determined forthwith by the Judge without a jury, sitting as
Chancellor." Klein, J., of the Orphans' Court of Philadelphia, dismissing exceptions and affirming the opinion of the hearing judge, said:
"The parties agreed, further, to be bound by the determination of
the Chancellor, res-erving the right of excepiton and appeal. By virtue of
this stipulation, the Hearing Judge was sitting not only to preliminarily
determine whether there was a substantial dispute on which to base an
issue, but actually was constituted the ultimate trier of the facts. The case
therefore resolves itself into one in which the fact findings, based on
credibility of witnesses who appeared personally before the Chancellor,
must be accepted by the court en banc."11
The decree was affirmed per curiam on the opinion of Judge Klein. A trial
by jury may likewise be obviated by stating in the petition of appeal that all mat53 See note 52.
64 278 Pa. 170, 122 A. 267 (1923); also 54 Dicx L. Rav 245 (1950).
65 363 Pa. 559, 70 A.2d. 339 (Jan. 5, 1950).
56 Citing Robert's Estate, 350 Pa. 467, 39 A.2d. 592 (1944).
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ters shall be determined by the hearing judge. However, as has already been observed, this does not preclude the court from sending, of its own volition, the
case to a jury for determination of the facts.
Framing Issues
Where an appeal is taken from the register's decision in a will contest or
there is a certification of the record, the appellant in the petition to the orphans'
court prays for certain relief. If a trial by jury is sought, the suggested issues
should be set forth with clarity, precision and terseness. Furthermore, the issues
must embody proposition of fact and not conclusions of law, i. e. is this the will
of John Smith, the testator, has been held to be improper. In Phillips' Estate 7
Simpson, J. observed:
"This is an appeal from the refusal of the court below to award an
issue devisavit vel non. The petition prayed that it be granted on two
grounds: (1) To determine whether or not decedent had testamentary
capacity; and (2) Whether or not the writing produced "is the last will
and testament of Mary Phillips, deceased." The latter involves a mixed
question of law and fact, and cannot properly be made the subject of an
issue devisavit vel non: Bitner v. Bitner, 65 Pa. 347; Lappe's Est., 215
Pa. 424, 427. It was, therefore, wisely excluded from consideration in
the court below, as it will be here."
In Imbrie's Estate58 the issues were as follows:
"(1)
Whether or not at the time the writing was executed was Luella Irene Imbrie of sound and disposing mind?
(2) Whether or not the writing was executed by Luella
Irene Imbrie in the manner required by law to establish it as
a will?"
In reviewing the procedure and the results of the jury trial in the orphans'
court, Wilson, J. of Beaver County, opined:
"The negative answers of the jury to the two questions do not show
a confusion, but a nice consistency. The evidence as to mental capacity
and form of execution were so interlaced, that, if Mrs. Imbrie lacked
capacity, the conclusion that the execution of the instrument was such
as not to meet the legal requirements of a will was inescapable. Therefore, we submitted the two questions, under what we considered proper
instructions." 59
The decree sustaining the verdict and judgment against the will was affirmed
per curiam and without comment.6 0
57 299 Pa. 415, 149 A. 719 (1930); See also In Re Tranor's Estate, 324 Pa. 263, 188 A.
292 (1936); Orlany's Est., 336 Pa. 369 9 A.2d 539 (1939); Hu'rTON ON WILLs, 388.

68 349 Pa. 158, 37 A.2d. 520 (1944). An excellent case illustrating complete procedure in
contested will.
59 Suppose, however, jury had found in the affirmative on 1st issue. Does the 2nd issue involve a mixed question of law and fact?
60 Cf. Aggas v. Munnell, 302 Pa. 78, 152 A. 840 (1930)

where judgment n.o.v. entered

for proponent plaintiff was reversed and record remitted for probate of will.
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In Stewart's Estate"' the issue was refused on question of testamentary capacity but was granted on that of undue influence. The jury found there was undue
influence. In Ross' Estate"' the issues prayed for were concerning testamentary
63
capacity and undue influence which the court refused.
judgment N. 0. V.
The Act of April 22, 1905, as amended," 4 provides for the entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict upon the whole record and it will be noticed in
many of the will contests, involving issues d.v.n., motions have been made pur65
suant to this act. In Morrish's Estate Hirt, J. declared:
"The Act of April 22, 1905, P. L. 286, 12 P. S. 681, is eually
applicable to trials by jury in the orphans' court as in the common pleas.
However, in Stewart's Estate 6 Jones, J. qualified this statement by the following observation:
"We do not agree, however, that, in passing upon the proponents'
motion for judgment n.o.v., the court below was required to view the
verdict on the basis of the facts and inferences most favorable to the
successful party. Compare In re Morrish's Estate, 156 Pa. Super. 394,
40 A. 2d. 907. Such is the nile in an action at law where the jury is the
sole judge of the facts. But, in the trial of an issue devisavit vel non,
where the trial judge sits as a chancellor, his conscience must be satisfied with the justness of the verdict on the basis of all of the evidence.
If the chancellor is not so satisfied, he may set aside the verdict even
though it might otherwise be found sustainable solely upon the facts and
inferences most favorable to the verdict. Once the chancellor approves
and accepts the verdict, it becomes binding in the will contest in the Orphans' Court as determinative of the fact so established. In re Cross'
Estate, 278 Pa. 170, 184, 122 A. 267. But, 'In every case tried before
a jury in which the trial judge sits as a chancellor, the evidence is addressed to him quite as much as to the jury; it must as a whole be judged
by him independently of the jury, just satisfy his (legal) conscience as
well as the jury, and cannot be rightfully submitted to the jury as a basis
of any finding which he would not approve; in a word, he cannot permit the jury to do what he, as a chancellor (after weighing the evidence
in the light of the established law upon the subject), would not do.'
In re Phillips' Estate, 244 Pa. 35, 42, 90 A. 457, 460, quoting with
approval from opinion of Judge Endlich in Caughey v. Bridenbaugh,
208 Pa. 414, 415, 57 A. 821, affirmed per curiam.
"The foregoing quotation was spoken with respect to the jury's verdict on the trial of an issue d.v.n. certified to the Common Pleas under
61 354 Pa. 288, 47 A.2d. 204 (1946); same case on bill of review, 358 Pa, 434, 58 A.2d.

42 (1948).

62 355 Pa. 112, 49 A.2d. 392 (1946).
63 See Re Slichter's Estate, 354 Pa. 448, 47 A.2d. 691 (1946) where Supreme Court reversed and granted issues.
64 12 P. S. 681.
65 156 Pa. Super. 394, 40 A.2d. 907 (1945).
66 354 Pa. 288, 47 A.2d. 204 (1946) ; see same case for bill of revieW, note 61, supra.
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the practice obtaining prior to the Act of July 1, 1937, P. L. 2665, 20
P. S. section 2585. It is no less applicable to a jury's verdict in the trial
of an issue in Orphans' Court under the provisions of that Act. The
Act of April 22, 1905, P. L. 286, 12 P. S. section 681, which provides
for the filing of motions for judgment n.o.v., is adaptable to the trial
of an issue d.v.n. only to the extent of the procedure it prescribes for
raising the alleged invalidity of a verdict as a matter of law. It does not
import into the question of the sustainability of a verdict on an issue
d.v.n. the binding effect of the rule as to the evidence permissibly cognizable in testing a verdict rendered by a jury in a trial at law."
The Stewart case on the points as quoted was followed in McConnell v. Hill"1
in a lucid and scholarly opinion by Judge Gearhart, specially presiding in Carbon County, and affirmed per curiam. It is obvious that the procedure under the
judgment n.o.v. statute can have but limited application to a form of jury trial
either in common pleas or orphans' court which is based upon the sitting chancelor doctrine and avowed not to be a common law right or within the aegis of
the Pennsylvania Constitutional mandate that "trial by jury shall be as heretofore,
and the right thereof remain inviolate."6 8 As stated by Judge Gearhart in McConnell v. Hill, #pr,4a:
"Consequently, in considering the motion for judgment n.o.v., we
must review all the evidence presented in this case in the light of the
familiar principle controlling the award of issues in this Court which
makes it the duty of a judge to refuse to present a question to the jury
unless he feels the ends ofjustice call for a verdict against the will, or
he is so uncertain on this point that he could conscionably sustain a finding either way on one or more of the controlling issues involved. In re
Tetlow's Estate, 269 Pa. 486, 112 A. 758; In re Noble's Estate, 338
Pa. 490, 13 A. 2d. 422; Central Trust Co., Ex'r, v. Boyer, 308 Pa. 402,
408, 409, 162 A. 806."
Furthermore, on appeal the higher court will review the entire record and
if the verdict is not in law supported by the required evidence will reverse the
judgment despite the jury's determination as was done in Aggas v. Munnell. 9
Parties to Issue
The accepted practice in vogue now for many years has been to make the
proponents of the will plaintiffs in the issue and the contestants as the defendants.
This is the logical arrangement of the parties and is in accordance with the elementary principles in argumentation and debate that the affirmative goes forward first and essentially has the laboring oar, so the proponent of the will has
the affirmative of the issue, viz., the eventual establishment of the will, and is
67 358 Pa. 414, 58 A.2d. i5s (1948). It will be noted the issue was tried in common pleas
and but one appeal was taken, viz, from judgment of that court.
68 See Re Fleming's Estate, 265 Pa. 399, 109 A. 265 (1919); note the strong dissenting
opinion of Simpson, J.
69 See note 60, supra.
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therefore placed in the role of plaintiff. The modern' practice is illustrated by
numerous cases.
However, over a half century ago, Green, J. of our Supreme Court, argued
to the contrary in the notable case of Yardley v. Cuthbertson, 0 and in the likewise celebrated case of Caughey v. Bridenbazrgh,7 1 some years later, is an application of the theory of the learned justice. However, it has been stated that the
framing of the issue is wholly within the discretion of the court and is not reviewable, 72 Notwithstanding, the present practice, long established
in Philadel78
phia County, is now general throughout the commonwealth.
Appellant
The question may arise as to who are proper parties to an appeal either from
the action of the register or the orphans' court, in the matter of a contested will.
Under the statutes such a party is described as a "person interested" in setting
aside probate or a "party entitled to appeal" within the statutes.71 Basically there
must be an interest which is pecuniary and distinguished from an interest which
is more likely civic, public or sentimental or what might be classified as pro bono
pmblico.
In King's Estate7 Judge Hanna l'id that an executor whose demand for
probate and letters testamentary was denied, is a "party interested" who may appeal from the register's decision. On the other hand in Adam's Estate1s Judge
Ashman held that the will having been probated, the executor's interest, under
the circumstances of the case, ceased and he was not a proper party to an appeal
from the decision of the register granting an issue. However, in Yardley v. Cuthberson7" after the will was probated an issue was awarded and in the framing
of the same the executors were made plaintiffs and contestants the defendants. In
Knecht's Estate"8 it was stated by Patterson, J., citing cases, that the right of one
to letters of administration, c.t.a. is not absolute but contingent and is not such
an interest in the estate as entitles him to contest the will. 79 In Yeager's Estateso
it was decided that executors had no right to appeal from an allowance of a claim
for professional services where there was a balance more than sufficient to pay
70 108 Pa. 395, 1 A. 765. (1885).
71 208 Pa. 414, 67 A. 821 (1904).
72 Palmer's Estate, 132 Pa. 297, 19 A. 137 (1890); cf. Newhard v. Mundt, 132 Pa. 324,
19 A. 298 (1890).

78 See Ruddach v. Reichbach, 17 W. N. C. 549 (1886) and article following report; also

20 P. S. 1961 supp. The matter is discussed in 53 DICK L. REV 19 and 245 (1948).

74 Knecht's Est., 341 Pa. 292, 19 A.2d. 111 (1941), citing 20 P. S. sections 343, 1886, 1961,

2005.
75 9 W. N. C. 207, 13 Phila. 379 (1880).
16 16 Dist. Rep. 183 (1907).
77 See note 70, supra. A case worthy of study together with Cuthbertson's Appeal, 97 Pa.

163 (1881).
78 See note 74, supra.
79 Winters' Estate, 57 D. & C. 433 (1945)

per Chadwick, J. of Delaware Co. giving many

cases on general topic but main question not directly in point.

80 349 Pa. 222, 36 A.2d. 795 (1944).
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all claims. In Ash's Estate81 it was remarked that a legatee whose legacy was revoked in a subsequent will is a "person interested" and entitled to contest the subsequent will.
It seems from the cases that the interest of appellant or contestant in will
cases must be based upon a money or material value and that in the instance of
a right to administer the same is contingent but emoluments of office may be
quite material from a pecuniary aspect. Again, there is a distinction quite discernible between an administrator in prospective and one appointed as executor in
the last will and testament of one now deceased.
Appeals
The matter of appeals from the judicial acts of the register has already been
discussed, 82 and there remains for brief mention the appeals from the results of
the will contest in orphans' court and the issues as awarded.
The Act of May 11, 1927, P. L. 972 (No, 464), the last of a series of acts
on appeals,8 8 provides, inter alia, as follows:
"No appeal shall be allowed in any case from an order, judgment
or decree of an court of common pleas, or orphans' court, unless taken
within three calendar months from the entry of the order, judgment, or
decree appealed from, nor shall an appeal supersede an execution issued
or distribution ordered, unless taken and perfected, and bail entered in
the manner herein prescribed within three weeks from such entry."
In Cross' Bstateg' it was pointed out that if the judgment of the common
pleas on a verdict on an issue sent to it from the orphans' court, is conclusive on
the orphans' court, the period for taking an appeal runs from the date of entry
of the judgment, but if verdict is advisory only, then the time for appeal runs
from the entry of the final decree of the orphans' court. In Core's Estate85 it was
declared that the power of the court did permit the extension of time for taking
an appeal and in Yeager's Estates6 it was stated the time could not be waived by
the parties.
The appellant must be a natural person, corporation or partnership, and an
appeal cannot be taken in the name of an estate. Furthermore, there must be separate appeals for each unless the parties have a joint interest.87
81 351 Pa. 317, 41 A.2d. 620 (1945).
82 54 DicK L. Rrv 241; Act of June 7, 1917, P. L. 415, 20 P. S. 2005.
88 Act of May 19, 1897, P. L. 67; Act of March, 22, 1923, P. L. 30; Act of March 12, 1925,
P. L. 32; Act of May 11, 1927, P. L. 972, 12 P. S. 1136; For bail section, see 12 P. S. 1137;

Sec. 22 of Orphans' Court Act of June 7, 1917, P. L. 363, providing six months as time is
superseded by the above.
84 278 Pa. 170, 122 A. 267 (1923). R1sm:CK, 4th Ed. advises appeals from C. P. and 0. C.
85 113 Pa. Super. 388, 174 A. 9 (1934).
88 349 Pa. 222, 36 A.2d. 795 (1944); Wesner's Estate, 139 Pa. Super. 314, 11 A.2d. 521
(1940).
87 REzmcK, 4th Ed. Vol. 2, page 939.
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If the amount in controversy does not exceed or as the statute says "be not
greater than twenty-five hundred dollars, exclusive of costs, and if also the claim,
dispute, or other proceeding be not brought, authorized or defended by the Attorney General in his official capacity" then the appeal is to the Superior Court,8s
otherwise to the Supreme Court. 89
Conclusion
The following summary of testamentary capacity collated over the years may
be generally helpful to the reader.
1. Every person of sound mind and of the age of 21 years or upwards,
whether married or single, is competent to make a will disposing of his
or her property.
2. During any war in which the United States is engaged, a person of sound
mind 18 years of age or older and being in th'e armed forces of the United
States in active service at home or abroad, or being a mariner on land or
at sea, may by will dispose of all his real and personal estate subject to
payment of debts and charges and may thereafter revoke such a will
whether or not the United States is engaged in war and whether or not
he is still in such service or is a mariner.
3. In cases of nuncupation the required age of the testator is 21 years or upwards and under the Wills Act of 1947 there is no exception to this requirement.
4. The courts have recognized in a long line of decisions "the unquestioned
right which every one master of himself has to give his property to whom
he pleases," per Maxey, J., citing Kustus v. Hager, 269, Pa. 103, 112 A.
45 (1920), as quoted in Mohler's Estate, 343 Pa. 299 22 A.2d 680
(1941).

5. No right of a citizen is more valued than the power to dispose of his
property by will, and his last and final direction should not be struck
down except for the clearest reason.
6. Where a paper in testamentary form is proved to be properly executed
there arise two presumptions, (a) that the willmaker was of testamentary capacity and that the testamentary act was free from undue influence;
and (b) that the willmaker was at the time of the execution of the will
"of the age of twenty-one years or upwards."
7. To upset such a will the contestants must adduce compelling evidence,
since the law favors its validity, per Drew, J. in Olshefski's Estate, 347
Pa. 420, 11 A.2d. 487 (1940).
88 17 P. S. 185 and 188.

89 12 P. S. 1091. For a unique illustration of an anomalous situation as to respective liti.
gants and vision of amount of interest, see REMICK, supra, page 940. also Act of June 11, 1935,
P. L. 30; 12 P. S. 1107, a, b.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

8. If the will is probated and no appeal is taken for 2 years from the decree
of the Register, the presumption as to full age becomes condusive.
9, An adjudication of the insanity of the willmaker either shortly before the
execution of thL will or shortly afterward, or any other evidence of insanity at or about the time of execution of the will, offered by contestants will dislodge the presumption of capacity and impose upon the proponents the burden of establishing the same by the preponderance of
evidence.
10. A willmaker shown by the weight of evidence to have been generally insane at the time of execution lacks testamentary capacity and the will is
invalid.
11. A willmaker shown by the weight of evidence to be partially insane may
nevertheless have testamentary capacity if the weight of evidence shows a
lucid interval at the time of execution sufficient to measure up to the prescribed test.
12. Old age, sickness, distress, debility of body, peculiar beliefs and opinions,
incapacity to do business, partial failure of memory neither prove nor raise
a presumption of incapacity.
13. A delusion amounting to monomania and shown to be the immediate
cause of the testamentary disposition may render the will invalid although
the testator has general testamentary capacity.
14. Antipathies, dislikes and hatreds reflected in testamentary dispositions
are of themselves insufficient to render a will invalid unless they transcend to delusions as heretofore stated.
15. A potent and frequently controlling factor in will contests is the evercise of the judicial function as developed in the evolution of the issue
devisavit vel non.00 For a curious case combining fraud on register, substantial dispute, right of appeal of next of kin of incompetent ward and duty
of Common Pleas to act for ward's best interest and generally the granting of an issue to determine validity of will for lack of testamentary capacity, fraud, and undue influence, Brindle's Estate, 360 Pa. 53 60 A.2d. 1
(1948); Note the appeals as taken.
Professor Hutton will review the proposed Orphans' Court Act of 1951 in the October
issue of the DICKINSON LAW REVIEW.
90 Re Lewis' Estate,
Pa.
-, 72 A.2d. 80; (March 20, 1950) Re Wilson's Estate,
Pa.
, 72 A.2d. 561; (April 10, 1950) both affording good study material, the
first reversing and remanding record with direction to grant the issue d.v.n., the second affirm.
ing judgment on verdict by jury against will and refusal to enter judgment n.o.v. for proponent.
An interesting recent book-CoURT ISINSESSION, by Levy and Smolens--Crown Publishers, 419-4th Av., New York (16) may be read, particularly Hunter's Will therein.

